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A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE FOR SHIFTING FEES: 
ATTORNEY-FEE AWARDS IN PATENT SUITS AFTER 
OCTANE AND HIGHMARK 
Darin Jones∗ 
Abstract: Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes courts to award attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in patent litigation in “exceptional cases.” Until recently, interpretation of 
§ 285 had been governed by a highly restrictive formulation set forth by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In April 2014, the United States Supreme Court 
released a pair of decisions—Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness, and Highmark Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.—that rejected the Federal Circuit’s interpretation 
of § 285 and reinvigorated the potential for fee shifting in patent suits. This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Octane and Highmark broaden the potential for parties in 
patent litigation—particularly defendants—to seek and receive awards of attorney fees. This 
Note presents a survey and analysis of the district court opinions deciding attorney-fee 
motions under § 285 announced in the eight months following Octane and Highmark. The 
results of that survey indicate that defendants are now significantly more likely to receive 
attorney-fee awards than they were previously. This Note ultimately argues that defendants 
in patent suits should consider these new fee dynamics as a key element of their litigation 
strategy from the outset of patent defense cases. Doing so may enable them to take advantage 
of the newly expanded opportunity for fee shifting. To that end, this Note suggests that 
defendants should actively strive to inform district court judges about their broad authority to 
award fees. Additionally, this Note recommends that litigants avoid analogizing to prior 
successful cases when arguing for fees. Instead, this Note proposes that parties should follow 
the example set by the Supreme Court and focus on the plain meaning of the statute using 
common sense arguments. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party.”1 
 
In civil litigation in the United States, “[e]ach litigant pays his own 
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise.”2 This “bedrock principle [is] known as the ‘American 
∗The Author began research for this Note while working as a summer associate in the Office of the 
General Counsel of Hewlett-Packard Co. The opinions appearing herein are entirely his own. 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
2. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010) (“‘Our basic point of 
reference’ when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the 
‘American Rule’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides otherwise.” (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)). 
505 
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Rule.’”3 Title 35 of the United States Code, the title that governs patent 
law, contains one of the exceptions to that general rule. The fee-shifting 
provision in § 285 allows district courts discretion to award attorney fees 
“in exceptional cases.” The text of § 285 has remained identical since 
1952.4 For most of the last ten years, however, judicial interpretation of 
§ 285 had been governed by the “rigid and mechanical formulation”5 set 
forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Brooks Furniture Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.6 
The Brooks Furniture framework, as it came to be known, permitted 
attorney fees awards in only two circumstances: if a moving party could 
prove that its opponent had engaged in material litigation misconduct, or 
when the case was brought in subjective bad faith and the claims were 
objectively baseless.7 Moving parties were required to show these 
elements by clear and convincing evidence.8 Over time, the rigid 
interpretation of § 285 under Brooks Furniture garnered an increasing 
amount of criticism from prominent commentators, who argued that 
patent litigants—particularly defendants—needed a “flexible” rule that 
would “discourage aggressive suits and frivolous demands.”9 Practically 
speaking, patent defendants have had relatively little opportunity to use 
fee awards to discourage frivolous, expensive litigation.10 As of last 
spring, that landscape is shifting. 
In April 2014, the United States Supreme Court responded to the 
3. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “American rule” as 
“[t]he general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees”). 
This default rule is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, 
these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be 
allowed to the prevailing party.”). The American Rule traces its roots back at least to the eighteenth 
century. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (holding that it was error for 
the district court to include a charge of counsel fees against the losing party because “[t]he general 
practice of the United States is in oposition to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in 
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute” (original 
spelling maintained)). This practice lies in direct contrast to the “so-called English rule, under which 
the loser at trial bears his opponent’s legal fees as well as his own.” STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 428 (2004). 
4. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952). 
5. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014). 
6. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
7. Id. at 1381. 
8. Id. at 1382. 
9. Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25 (noting that “[f]rivolous suits are costing billions and hurting 
innovation,” and urging federal judges to exercise their discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 285 to award 
attorney fees against “patent trolls”). 
10. Id. (observing that, despite having “the authority they need to shift the cost burden of 
litigation abuse from the defendant . . .[,] judges don’t do so very often”). 
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longstanding criticism that the Federal Circuit had improperly 
eviscerated congressional intent to provide meaningful fee-shifting in 
§ 285. In two landmark decisions—Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health 
& Fitness, Inc.11 and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management 
System, Inc.12—the Court may have significantly expanded the 
availability of attorney fee awards in patent infringement suits, and, 
consequently, fundamentally altered the dynamics of patent litigation 
suits. 
This Note documents the shifting landscape of fee awards under 
§ 285, and offers concrete suggestions to litigants, particularly 
defendants, about how best to take advantage of courts’ new potential 
receptivity to awarding fees in appropriate cases. In Part I, this Note 
briefly describes the statutory history of the Patent Act’s fee-shifting 
statute, and reviews the provision’s interpretation prior to the Supreme 
Court’s twin decisions in Octane and Highmark—including a synopsis 
of the now-defunct Brooks Furniture framework that governed 
previously. Part II describes the Octane and Highmark decisions, 
analyzing the Court’s interpretation of the language as well as the 
purpose behind § 285. Part III examines the post-Octane world. It 
canvasses and describes the results from the first fifty-five decisions that 
have applied Octane and Highmark. It includes a survey of the district 
court opinions deciding a motion for attorney fees under § 285 released 
between April 29, 2014 (the day Octane and Highmark were decided), 
and December 31, 2014. Finally, in Part IV, this Note suggests that 
defendants in patent litigation should more aggressively seek fees in 
light of the most recent developments. In particular, this Note argues (1) 
that litigants should strive to inform courts that awards of attorney fees 
are within the discretion of individual judges considering the totality of 
the circumstances in a particular case, and (2) that judges should use 
common sense, informed by their own experience, in determining 
whether an individual case is “exceptional.” The information presented 
in this Note is designed to assist litigants who wish to take advantage of 
the apparently broadening opportunity to receive fee awards in the new 
legal landscape opened by Octane and Highmark. 
I. THE WORLD BEFORE OCTANE AND HIGHMARK 
In order to understand the effect that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Octane and Highmark will have on attorney-fee disputes going forward, 
it is necessary to understand the state of the law prior to these decisions. 
11. __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
12. __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
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Part I.A begins with a discussion of the legislative history of the fee-
shifting statute that applies in patent suits, 35 U.S.C. § 285. Part I.B 
outlines the Federal Circuit’s decision in Brooks Furniture Inc. v. 
Dutailier International, Inc.,13 which governed interpretation of § 285 
from 2005 until April 2014, when the Octane and Highmark cases were 
decided. 
A. Statutory History of 35 U.S.C. § 285 
Prior to 1946, the American Rule—by which each party to litigation 
pays its own attorney fees—applied in patent litigation just as it does in 
civil litigation generally.14 Then in 1946, Congress created a statutory 
exception in the body of law that governs patent litigation and granted 
district courts the discretion to “award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent case.”15 This 
fee-shifting provision was added to the former 35 U.S.C. § 70 (now 
§ 285) and took effect immediately upon approval.16 
Congress had no intention, however, for that amendment to transform 
the American patent litigation system into a loser-pays regime. On the 
13. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
14. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“‘Our basic point 
of reference’ when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the 
‘American Rule’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides otherwise.” (quoting Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)). 
15. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778, 778. There is no definitive understanding of what 
motivated Congress’s decision to enact a fee-shifting provision in 1946. Research into 
contemporary news sources suggests that the public conversation on patent reform was focused 
primarily on the perception that large corporations were exploiting the patent monopoly to unfairly 
restrain trade. See, e.g., Editorial, Revamping the Patent System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1945, at 4 
(decrying a proposed compulsory license regime as “socialization” and commenting that “it is little 
business which most needs patents, to protect itself from big business”). This sentiment was 
expressed by Representative Jerry Voorhis of California, who presented to the House a list of 
“possible areas for action” to “check the abuses that threaten our American System of Free 
Competitive Enterprise.” 92 CONG. REC. A35–36 (Jan. 14, 1946) (statement of Rep. Voorhis). 
Among other suggestions to promote competition and support technological developments, 
proposals included the following, which was captioned “Government, financial and legal assistance 
to inventors or businessmen who are financially unable to defend their patents”: 
Many a business has been throttled, and many an inventor has been kept from enjoying the 
benefits of his patent because of a suit for infringement brought against him by a powerful 
corporation. In such cases, it is almost inevitable that the small patent holder must yield to the 
rich corporation—because patent litigation is long and costly. It is suggested that Government 
be required by law to subsidize patent litigation—thus giving both parties to the suit an even 
break. Here again we have good precedent for such a law—even a common criminal is 
furnished legal counsel for his defense if he is unable to secure such counsel with his own 
means. 
Id. at A36 (statement of Rep. Voorhis). Granting courts the discretion to award attorney fees, 
conceivably, was a way to remedy the perceived power imbalance in patent litigation without 
requiring direct government subsidy. 
16. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, 60 Stat. at 778. 
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contrary, the Senate Committee on Patents reported that it did “not 
contemplate[] that the recovery of attorney’s fees [would] become an 
ordinary thing in patent suits.”17 Congress included the provision “so as 
to enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer.”18 
Allowing district courts the discretion to award fees, Congress believed, 
would also deter willful infringement “by anyone thinking that all he 
would be required to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty.”19 
In the years following the amendment’s adoption, courts understood 
that Congress wanted the provision to be applied only in limited 
circumstances. An early decision out of the Northern District of Ohio 
explained that, in that court’s view, it was “apparent from the wording of 
the statute and its history that an award of attorneys’ fees should not be 
made in an ordinary case. The court is invested with discretionary power 
where it is necessary to prevent gross injustice.”20 A few years later, in 
1951, the Ninth Circuit expressed essentially the same interpretation of 
the 1946 fee-shifting provision: 
Congress made plain its intention that such fees be allowed only 
in extraordinary circumstances. . . . Thus, the payment of 
attorney’s fees for the victor is not to be regarded as a penalty 
for failure to win a patent infringement suit. The exercise of 
discretion in favor of such an allowance should be bottomed 
upon a finding of unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the 
losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar 
force, which makes it grossly unjust that the winner of the 
particular law suit be left to bear the burden of his own counsel 
fees which prevailing litigants normally bear.21 
This reading was supported by numerous decisions from courts across 
the country.22 
17. S. REP. NO. 1503 (1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Lincoln Electric Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 74 F. Supp. 293, 294 (N.D. Ohio 1947) (finding 
no “special circumstances of gross injustice” in the case before it and denying fees), aff’d, 171 F.2d 
223 (6th Cir. 1948). 
21. Park-In Theatres v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951). 
22. See, e.g., Merrill v. Builders Ornamental Iron Co., 197 F.2d 16, 25 (10th Cir. 1952) 
(explaining that “where conventional procedure is followed by the unsuccessful party litigant, 
attorney’s fees are not to be awarded against him as a penalty for failing to prevail”); Orrison v. C. 
Hoffberger Co., 190 F.2d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1951) (affirming district court’s award of fees for 
“vexatious and unjustified” litigation conduct); Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 178 F.2d 104, 105 (7th 
Cir. 1949) (affirming district court’s award of fees but noting that “attorneys’ fees are not to be 
allowed in the usual patent case”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 
215, 217 (D. Md. 1950) (“[W]e are not disposed to make an award under the provision of [35 
U.S.C. § 70] except, of course, in a very extreme or aggravated situation involving more oppressive 
or vexatious conduct on the part of a patentee than we find in the present case.”), aff’d, 185 F.2d 
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In 1952, Congress enacted a large-scale revision and recodification of 
the patent laws.23 As part of the 1952 Patent Act, the fee-shifting 
provision—which had previously appeared in § 70—received its own 
section, 35 U.S.C. § 285. That statute reads in its entirety as follows: 
“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party.”24 The text of § 285 has remained identical since 
1952.25 
Although on its face the 1952 Amendment appeared to narrow the 
scope of the fee-shifting provision, the legislative history indicates that 
Congress had no desire to change the way courts were adjudicating fee 
awards in patent suits.26 In fact, the historical and revision notes that 
672 (5th Cir. 1950). 
23. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified in title 35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
24. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). Note that Congress added an identical fee-shifting provision into the 
Lanham Act, governing trademarks, in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 
1955 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012)). 
25. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952), with 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). Although members of 
Congress introduce amendments from time to time, none have proved successful. See, e.g., 
Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (introduced Oct. 13, 2013) (proposing an 
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 285 that would mandate an award of costs and fees in patent suits unless 
the losing party was “substantially justified or . . . special circumstances make an award unjust”); 
Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013 113th Cong. § 5 (introduced May 22, 2013) 
(proposing amending 35 U.S.C. § 285 to require awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in 
patent suits unless a non-prevailing party can prove that its litigation conduct was reasonable and 
that it had a good faith justification for commencing the suit); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 
2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (introduced Oct. 30, 2013). For additional discussions of recent attempts 
at patent reform, see Ryan Hauer, Another Attempt at Patent Reform: S.1013 The Patent Abuse 
Reduction Act of 2013, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 367 (2014). 
26. In the hearing before the house subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the 
House Judiciary Committee, P.J. Federico, a long-time, high-ranking official within the Patent 
Office, addressed this issue directly in response to questioning by committee member Rep. Shepard 
J. Crumpacker, Jr.: 
MR. CRUMPACKER: “On attorney fees, it says the court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees. Does not that open the door to all kinds of interpretations as to what 
is meant by the language, or is there already a body of law as to what ‘exceptional cases’ are 
intended?” 
MR. FEDERICO: “The present statute says the court may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party; which was introduced into the law by an act of 1946. The hearings and the 
reports of the committees showed that they intended that to apply to exceptional cases without 
going into detail, and the court decisions have followed that principle of awarding attorney fees 
in exceptional cases. What that constitutes is left, and stays left, to the discretion of the court 
that is conducting the case.”  
MR. CRUMPACKER: “Should not there be some kind of an expression of the particular areas 
that they intended to apply to? I never saw any statutory language as unclear to the uninitiated 
as that would be. It may mean something to an experienced patent lawyer, but just to look at 
that—”  
MR. FEDERICO: “That provision, as I said, came into the statute in 1946. There have been a 
number of rulings on it. In some cases the courts have denied attorney fees and in others, they 
have allowed them.” 
MR. CRUMPACKER: “You say the 1946 statute just said that the court in its discretion may 
award reasonable attorney fees; is that right?” 
MR. FEDERICO: “Yes.” 
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accompany § 285 explain that Congress meant for the current statute to 
be “substantially the same” as its predecessor.27 Congress added the 
phrase “in exceptional cases” to “express[] the intention of the present 
statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the 
courts.”28 In essence, therefore, by adding the phrase “in exceptional 
cases” Congress believed that it was merely codifying into the plain 
language of § 285 the interpretation that courts had read into the fee-
shifting provision ever since it was first adopted six years earlier.29 
Following the adoption of the 1952 Act, the district courts and various 
courts of appeals across the country interpreted § 285 just as they had 
evaluated the former § 70, using a holistic evaluation of the law and 
facts in each case.30 After 1952—indeed, from the passage of the 1946 
Amendment—federal courts recognized that the decision whether or not 
to award fees was within the discretion of trial judges evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances, and, consequently, that grants or denials of 
fees could not be overturned unless there had been an abuse of discretion 
by the trial judge.31 Then, in 1982, Congress established the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and granted that court exclusive 
MR. CRUMPACKER: “But this term ‘exceptional cases’ is introduced for the first time here, 
is it not?” 
MR. FEDERICO: “Yes. It was picked up from the reports in passing that first law, which 
indicated that that was what was meant, and the decisions of the courts that have followed 
that.” 
MR. CRUMPACKER: “That is all.” 
   1 PATENT LAW CODIFICATION & REVISION 108–09 (1952). 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
28. Id. 
29. See 1 PATENT LAW CODIFICATION & REVISION 108–09 (1952). 
30. See, e.g., Tex. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 114 F. Supp. 144, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1953) 
(interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 285 and explaining that “[j]udicial discretion, as we understand it, is 
impartial reasoning, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles, requiring the 
court, in consideration of the facts and circumstances, to decide as its reason and conscience dictate; 
it requires that the court be discreet, just, circumspect and impartial, and that it exercise cautious 
judgment. The term connotes the opposite of caprice and arbitrary action” (quoting Dixie Cup Co. 
v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., 174 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1949) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Nat’l-Simplex-Bludworth, Inc. v. Prothero, 130 F. Supp. 146, 152 (W.D. Wash. 1954) (“After a 
consideration of cases cited under the statute, together with all the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the Court feels that it is not a proper case for the award of attorneys fees.”). 
31. See, e.g., Turchan v. Cincinnati Mill. Mach. Co., 208 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1953) 
(explaining that after a district court awards attorney fees “the reviewing court will not interfere 
unless there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to caprice or an erroneous conception of 
law”); Shingle Prod. Patents, Inc. v. Gleason, 211 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that if a 
“district court has clearly stated the basis for its award of attorney’s fees, [an appellate] court may 
not interfere with the district court’s exercise of discretion except where there is an abuse of 
discretion . . . on the part of the trial judge” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Randolph Labs. v. 
Specialties Dev. Corp. 213 F.2d 873, 875–76 (3d Cir. 1954) (affirming denial of fees and finding 
“no basis in [the] record for holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
award . . . counsel fees”). 
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jurisdiction over appeals in patent suits.32 Congress recognized that 
patent law was becoming “an area in which the application of the law to 
the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different 
courtrooms in substantially similar cases.”33 Congress created the 
Federal Circuit with the hope that “the new court [would] bring[] 
uniformity to this field of law.”34 As the Federal Circuit became the only 
court with authority to hear patent appeals, the meaning of § 285 began 
to stray from the interpretation courts had employed previously.35 
B. The Federal Circuit and the Brooks Furniture Framework 
The most important early development in the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 285 was the institution of a higher burden of proof for 
the issue of “exceptionality.” In the 1990s, the court began requiring 
parties seeking attorney fees to prove exceptionality by clear and 
convincing evidence36—the level of proof normally required for fraud or 
32. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
33. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15. 
34. Id. 
35. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014) 
(noting that at first the Federal Circuit, “like the regional circuits before it, instructed district courts 
to consider the totality of the circumstances when making fee determinations under § 285,” but that 
later the appellate court “abandoned that holistic, equitable approach in favor of [the] more rigid and 
mechanical formulation” expressed in Brooks Furniture). Supreme Court criticism of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision-making is not unique to the § 285 context. Some commentators have noted that 
the “recent flurry of Supreme Court reversals is long overdue because the Federal Circuit has 
diverged from long-standing Supreme Court precedent in several core areas of patent law.” Gary M. 
Hoffman & Robert Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the 
Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining If It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 248 (2010). Additionally, observers have noted that the Federal Circuit often 
engages in “judicial hyperactivity”—a term that describes the court’s tendency “to lose track of the 
important distinction between trial and appellate roles . . . a form of decision-making at odds with 
traditional notions of appellate review.” William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial 
Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
725, 726 (2000). The Federal Circuit’s “hyperactivity” has been thoroughly studied in the context of 
patent law. See, e.g., Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical 
Study, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 721, 776 (2012) (finding that “the Federal Circuit in patent cases is more 
judicially hyperactive than the regional circuits”). 
36. This standard was in place at least by 1992 when the court decided Cambridge Products, Ltd. 
v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992). That opinion relies, arguably erroneously, 
on an earlier, 1985 decision by the Federal Circuit in Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM Inc., 
769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Reactive Metals, a case involving allegations of fraud 
perpetrated on the PTO, the court had explained that, when seeking attorney fees under § 285, “the 
quantum of proof required to prove bad faith conduct is clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 1582 
(emphasis added). In Cambridge Products and subsequent decisions, the court took the rationale 
further, and noted that exceptionality often arose in the context of bad faith litigation. Accordingly, 
the court demanded clear and convincing evidence on the issue of exceptionality itself, regardless of 
whether that characterization was due to bad faith, fraud, substantive weakness, or some other 
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similar offenses37—rather than by a preponderance of the evidence—the 
burden of proof that applies in most civil suits.38 In 2005, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit brought about the most dramatic shift in 
patent attorney-fee jurisprudence since the passage of the 1946 
Amendment:39 the landmark decision in Brooks Furniture 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.40 
In Brooks Furniture, the Federal Circuit exerted its authority to unify 
interpretation of the patent laws and imposed a rigid, one-size-fits-all 
analysis of § 285. This formulation replaced the free-form, totality-of-
the-circumstances evaluation that had previously governed fee-shifting 
disputes and which arguably created differing results despite similar 
factual scenarios. Brooks Furniture arose from a controversy between 
two companies that manufacture rocking chairs.41 Dutailier sent its 
competitor, Brooks Furniture, a cease-and-desist letter alleging that one 
of Brooks Furniture’s products infringed Dutailier’s design patent for 
rocking chair trim.42 Brooks Furniture then filed suit in the Eastern 
District of Tennessee, requesting a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement and invalidity of Dutailier’s design patent.43 Brooks 
Furniture also asserted unfair competition and patent mismarking 
claims.44 Dutailier subsequently filed suit in the District of Delaware 
“asserting patent infringement, Lanham Act and common law unfair 
competition, and deceptive trade practices under state consumer 
protection law.”45 Dutailier failed in its attempt to have the Tennessee 
case transferred to Delaware,46 so it brought its allegations as 
counterclaims to Brooks Furniture’s suit in Tennessee.47 
reason. Cambridge Prods., 962 F.2d at 1050–51. 
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 cmt. e (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2014) (noting that the “majority of courts apply the clear-and-convincing standard of proof to 
all elements of a claim for fraud”). 
38. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e 
(2003 & Supp. 2014) (“The normal standard of proof in civil cases is preponderance of the 
evidence.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014) (defining preponderance of the 
evidence and noting that it “is the burden of proof in most civil trials”). 
39. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754–55 (recounting the history of § 285 and explaining that the 
Federal Circuit “abandoned” more than fifty years of precedent when it imposed the “rigid and 
mechanical formulation” of Brooks Furniture). 
40. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
41. Id. at 1379. 
42. Id. 
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Brooks Furniture moved for summary judgment on its non-
infringement claim, and the district court in Tennessee granted the 
motion.48 By stipulated order, Brooks Furniture agreed to dismiss its 
remaining claims, and Dutailier dismissed its counterclaims.49 The court 
then granted Brooks Furniture’s motion for attorney fees under § 285, 
holding that the “circumstances of the case were exceptional” and that 
“Brooks had clearly prevailed on the infringement issue.”50 Once the 
district court determined the amount of the fee award, Dutailier appealed 
to the Federal Circuit, where the appellate panel reversed the district 
court’s judgment and vacated the fee award.51 
In its opinion overruling the district court’s judgment, the Federal 
Circuit imposed a new rule for interpreting § 285. It held that parties 
seeking attorney fees in patent litigation could prevail in only two 
circumstances: if they could prove either material inappropriate litigation 
conduct,52 or else “only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective 
bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.”53 Moreover, the 
framework laid out in Brooks Furniture required a showing of each 
element by clear and convincing evidence.54 Effectively, the Federal 
Circuit announced that it would reserve for itself the power ultimately to 
adjudicate individual disputes by proclaiming that it would review 
appeals de novo. 
Under the stringent Brooks Furniture framework, obtaining an award 
of attorney fees in a patent suit became very difficult. One study found 
that, during the period the Brooks Furniture framework was in force, 
attorney fees were awarded in only 0.6 percent of all patent cases.55 
Even when courts did grant fees, seventy-one percent of fee awards went 
to plaintiffs and only twenty-nine percent went to defendants.56 This 
result is interesting, when one considers that defendants, on average, are 
much more likely to be the prevailing party. With the exception of 
default judgment cases, “defendants won 71 percent of cases that 




51. Id. at 1385. 
52. Id. at 1381. 
53. Id. (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 1382. 
55. Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 59, 87 & 
n.73 (2013) (reporting that fees under § 285 were awarded in only 208 of the approximately 32,570 
patent cases filed between 2003 and mid-May 2013). 
56. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. 
ONLINE 15, 25 (2014). 
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fee awards as defendants.”57 The Federal Circuit did not hesitate to 
overrule district court decisions that it felt failed to reach the high bar.58 
It was in this climate that the parties in Octane Fitness and Highmark 
litigated their patent disputes. 
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REJECTS THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF § 285 AND 
REINVIGORATES ATTORNEY-FEE AWARDS IN PATENT 
CASES 
On April 29, 2014, the Supreme Court released two decisions that 
have the potential dramatically to change patent infringement litigation 
going forward. In Octane and Highmark, the Supreme Court struck 
down the “rigid and mechanical formulation”59 for interpreting 35 
U.S.C. § 285 articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.60 
These decisions are analyzed below. Part II.A outlines the factual and 
procedural background of the Octane case and Part II.B summarizes the 
Court’s holding and the reasoning behind it. Part II.C includes a brief 
history of the Highmark case, and an analysis of its conclusions. Finally, 
Part II.D contains a synopsis of the law that arises from Octane and 
Highmark together. 
A. In Octane Fitness the Supreme Court Reinterpreted § 285 and 
Declared that Analysis Should Focus on the Text of the Statute 
In Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,61 the 
Supreme Court abrogated the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture 
framework for evaluating motions for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285 and declared that the plain language of the statute grants district 
courts broad discretion to define “exceptional cases.” Octane is a 
relatively small manufacturer of exercise equipment.62 One of its 
57. Liang & Berliner, supra note 55, at 89. 
58. See, e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing district 
court’s award of attorney fees for failure to satisfy the “exacting standard” of Brooks Furniture). 
Between 2003 and May 2013 the Federal Circuit reversed approximately forty percent of district 
court attorney-fee awards under § 285. See Liang & Berliner, supra note 55, at 88 & n.78. Awards 
to defendants were reversed in roughly one out of every two cases, while awards to plaintiffs were 
reversed only half as often. Id. 
59. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014). 
60. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
61. 134 S. Ct. 1749. 
62. Id. at 1754–55. 
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competitors in this field is ICON Health & Fitness.63 ICON held a 
number of patents on exercise devices, and in 2008 ICON sued Octane 
for allegedly infringing one of its patents on an elliptical exercise 
machine.64 Octane denied infringement and argued that anyone who 
observed its device and compared it to ICON’s patent would plainly see 
that there had been no infringement.65 The district court agreed that there 
was no infringement.66 Octane then moved for attorney fees under § 285, 
and claimed that the suit was objectively baseless.67 Octane also argued 
that the suit had been brought in subjective bad faith.68 To support this 
allegation, Octane’s attorneys pointed to internal emails between ICON 
employees that—according to Octane—tended to show that the entire 
suit had been brought “as a matter of commercial strategy.”69 
Essentially, Octane argued, ICON had brought the suit in a blatant 
attempt to cripple Octane, its much smaller competitor in the fitness 
equipment market.70 
The district court ruled in Octane’s favor on summary judgment.71 
But, applying the stringent Brooks Furniture framework, it denied 
Octane’s motion for attorney fees.72 As the court noted, under Brooks 
Furniture, litigation could be deemed objectively baseless only when “a 
party’s assertions [were] ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant 
could believe [they] would succeed.’”73 The district court agreed that the 
suit had lacked merit, but could not conclude that it was objectively 
baseless.74 Because Octane failed to prove the first prong of Brooks 
63. Id. 
64. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-CV-319 ADM/SRN (D. 
Minn. Feb. 4, 2010) (Report and Recommendation of Nelson, Mag. J.) adopted by ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-CV-319 ADM/SRN, 2010 BL 99910 (D. Minn. 
May 5, 2010). 
65. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011 WL 
39000975, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011) (“In Octane’s view, the Court’s rulings should have been 
a foregone conclusion to anyone who visually inspected its machines’ linkage system, making 
Icon’s infringement assertions unreasonable and unsupportable.” (internal quotations and citation 
omitted)). 
66. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011 WL 
2457914 (D. Minn. June 17, 2011). 
67. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
70. Id. at 1755 & n.5. 
71. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011 WL 
2457914 (D. Minn. June 17, 2011). 
72. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, Civil No. 09-319 ADM/SER, 2011 WL 
3900975 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011). 
73. Id. (quoting iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
74. Id. at *1. 
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Furniture by clear and convincing evidence, the court did not need to 
evaluate the second prong: subjective bad faith.75 The court elected, 
however, to examine the allegations anyway.76 The court explained that 
“[s]ubjective bad faith,” under Brooks Furniture, “means ‘the plaintiff’s 
case must have no objective foundation, and the plaintiff must actually 
know this.’”77 In the court’s view, Octane had failed to support its 
assertion of bad faith on the part of ICON by clear and convincing 
evidence, and the court declined to grant Octane’s motions for attorney 
fees under § 285.78 Both ICON and Octane appealed.79 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed both conclusions. First, the 
court agreed that there had been no infringement and that the district 
court’s order granting summary judgment was appropriate.80 Second, the 
appellate court affirmed the denial of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285.81 Octane had contended that the district court, following Brooks 
Furniture, “applied an overly restrictive standard in refusing to find the 
case exceptional under § 285.”82 The three-judge panel spurned that 
contention and reiterated that the Brooks Furniture framework applied, 
commenting that it saw “no reason to revisit the settled standard for 
exceptionality.”83 Octane’s attorneys moved for writ of certiorari and the 
Supreme Court granted review.84 
Because the Federal Circuit is the only court of appeals with 
jurisdiction to hear appeals in patent suits, its decisions are binding upon 
district courts across the country. It is impossible to have a circuit split.85 
Many have argued that this “exclusive jurisdiction leads to poor 
percolation of legal ideas, less experimentation with legal principles, and 
ultimately, a patent law that, although uniform, is insular and severed 
from economic reality.”86 When the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a 
75. Id. at *3 (“Because Icon’s case was not objectively baseless, the inquiry could end here.”). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (quoting iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1377). 
78. Id. at *4. 
79. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014). 
80. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x 57, 63–64 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
81. Id. at 65. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari). 
85. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1442 (2012) 
(proposing the theory that the Federal Circuit’s “nonpatent docket” particularly in the realm of 
Veterans’ appeals, “might affect the development of patent law”). 
86. Id. 
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patent case that the Federal Circuit has decided, most commentators 
anticipate that the case will be overturned.87 Thus, when the Supreme 
Court granted review of both Octane and Highmark, patent litigators 
across the country expected something to happen.88 Many observers 
predicted that the Supreme Court would ultimately “make it much easier 
for victors in patent suits to force their opponents to pay their legal 
fees.”89 It was not apparent, however, how extensive the Court’s 
reexamination of § 285 would be. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness was a complete 
rejection of Brooks Furniture and of the Federal Circuit’s interpretation 
of § 285.90 Writing for a unanimous Court,91 Justice Sotomayor92 called 
the Brooks Furniture framework “unduly rigid and mechanical”93 and 
explained that the Federal Circuit’s test “impermissibly encumbers the 
statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”94 The Court announced 
that its “analysis begins and ends with the text of § 285.”95 Section 285’s 
text, the Court held, was “patently clear”96 and “inherently flexible.”97 
The key term, according to the Court, is the phrase “in exceptional 
87. See Steven Seidenberg, Federal Circuit Gets Reined in Over Patent Fees in Infringement 
Suits, A.B.A.J. (July 1, 2014, 8:50AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/federal_ 
circuit_gets_reined_in_over_patent_fees_in_infringement_suits (noting that the Supreme Court led 
by Chief Justice Roberts has “decided an unusually large number of patent cases” and “almost 
always overrul[es] the Federal Circuit”). The popular perception, as expressed by Heath W. 
Hoglund, chair of the Patents Division of the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, is that 
“[t]he only reason the Supreme Court will take up a Federal Circuit case is if the Supreme Court 
thinks the case should be reversed.” Id. Between 1999 and 2008, the Supreme Court reversed more 
than ninety-three percent of the patent decisions it reviewed from the Federal Circuit. Roy E. Hofer 
& Joshua H. James, Supreme Court Reversal Rates for Federal Circuit Cases, 6 LANDSLIDE, no. 4, 
Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 40. Between 2008 and 2012, however, the Court reversed only about twenty-
eight percent of the Federal Circuit’s patent cases it reviewed. Id. at 41. The overall reversal rate for 
the Federal Circuit’s patent cases at the Supreme Court between the October 1999 term and the 
2012 term that ended in June 2013 was roughly sixty-six percent. Id. 
88. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Extracting a Toll from a Patent “Troll”, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2013, at 
B1 (reviewing the background of the Octane and Highmark cases and speculating that the Supreme 
Court’s rulings might “make it much more expensive to file a frivolous [patent] suit, and perhaps 
scare patent holders away from filing meritorious suits”). 
89. Id. 
90. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). 
91. While the Supreme Court was unanimous in the judgment of the Octane case, Justice Scalia 
declined to join in the first three footnotes, relating to the legislative history of § 285. Id. at 1752. 
92. Before joining the federal bench, Justice Sotomayor was an intellectual property litigator at 
the boutique Manhattan firm of Pavia & Harcourt. See SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 
264–71 (2013). 
93. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754. 
94. Id. at 1755. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1756. 
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cases.”98 For definition of that phrase, the Court looked to dictionaries 
and to similar phrases in other sections of the U.S. Code.99 
The Court further declared that adjudications should be made on a 
“case-by-case” basis, and that district courts should look to “the totality 
of the circumstances.”100 Additionally, the burden of proof in § 285 
cases should be preponderance of the evidence, thus mirroring the 
burden in other elements of patent litigation, and civil litigation in 
general.101 The Federal Circuit’s clear-and-convincing standard was too 
high, and the Supreme Court rejected it.102 
B. In Highmark, the Supreme Court Declared that Review of 
Decisions Under § 285 Should be for Abuse of Discretion 
In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.,103 the 
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s standard for reviewing 
§ 285 attorney-fee awards and announced that discretionary fee awards 
should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.104 The litigation arose 
when Highmark, Inc., a health insurance company,105 sued Allcare 
Health Management System, Inc., a company in the business of 
“licensing of intellectual-property assets,”106 seeking a declaratory 
judgment of invalidity related to an Allcare-managed patent covering 
“utilization review in managed health care systems.”107 Both Highmark 
and Allcare filed motions for summary judgment, and the district court 
granted Highmark’s motion.108 The Federal Circuit affirmed.109 The 
98. Id.; see also examples and discussion infra Part II.C. 
99. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. Courts interpreting the Lanham Act’s identical fee-shifting 
provision, § 35(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012)), have relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Octane for precedent. See, e.g., Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314–
15 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that the Court’s definition of “exceptionality” in Octane 
“controls . . . interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act”). 
100. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
101. Id. at 1758. 
102. Id. (“[N]othing in § 285 justifies such a high standard of proof. Section 285 demands a 
simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one. 
Indeed, patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence 
standard . . . .”). 
103. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
104. Id. at 1749. 
105. Id. at 1747. 
106. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 (N.D. Tex. 
2010). 
107. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 4:03-CV-1384-Y, 2008 
WL 4137959 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2008). 
109. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 329 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
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district court awarded attorney fees based on Highmark’s argument that 
Allcare had engaged in “vexatious and, at times, deceitful conduct.”110 
In the appeal of the attorney-fee decision, the Federal Circuit panel 
affirmed the award of attorney fees for one of the infringement claims, 
but reversed for the other claim.111 In the majority opinion, the appellate 
court reasoned that the objective baselessness prong of the Brooks 
Furniture framework “is a question of law based on underlying mixed 
questions of law and fact and is subject to de novo review.”112 Because 
the majority viewed the inquiry as a question of law, it explained that it 
would “review the court’s determination . . . without deference.”113 
In his partial dissent, Judge Mayer criticized the majority’s decision 
to review the second prong without deference and explained that he 
would have “affirm[ed] the district court’s award of attorney fees and 
expenses in its entirety.”114 Judge Mayer disparaged the Federal 
Circuit’s “increasing infatuation with de novo review”115 and reasoned 
that the court’s “exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases does 
not . . . grant [it] license to invade the fact-finding province of the trial 
courts.”116 The Federal Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, over 
a dissent from five judges.117 Highmark appealed, and the Supreme 
Court granted review.118 
Like its decision in Octane, the Supreme Court’s Highmark decision 
was unanimous. Justice Sotomayor, once more writing for the Court, 
again rejected the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 285 and held that 
the appellate court had erred in applying a de novo standard of review.119 
The Court explained that “as a matter of the sound administration of 
curiam). 
110. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 737 (N.D. Tex. 
2010). 
111. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The 
appellate court “affirmed the District Court’s exceptional-case determination with respect to the 
allegations that Highmark’s system infringed one claim of the . . . patent, but reversed the 
determination with respect to another claim of the patent.” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. 
Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014) (citations omitted). 
112. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004–06 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012)). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1319 (Mayer, J. dissenting in part). 
115. Id. at 1320. 
116. Id. 
117. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Judges 
Moore, Rader, O’Malley, Reyna, and Wallach dissented. Id. at 1356. 
118. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013) (mem.). 
119. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014). 
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justice, the district court is better positioned to decide whether a case is 
exceptional because it lives with the case over a prolonged period of 
time.”120 “Traditionally,” the Court expounded, “decisions on questions 
of law are reviewable de novo, decisions on questions of fact are 
reviewable for clear error, and decisions on matters of discretion are 
reviewable for abuse of discretion.”121 Because Congress, in § 285, 
explicitly placed the award of attorney fees at the discretion of district 
courts, a court of appeals—in this context, the Federal Circuit—can only 
overturn fee awards under § 285 if it finds that there had been an abuse 
of discretion.122 In essence, “an appellate court should apply an abuse-
of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 
interpretation.”123 Consequently, the Federal Circuit may only overturn a 
grant (or denial) of attorney fees to correct “a district court’s legal or 
factual error.”124 
C. Octane and Highmark Significantly Broaden District Court 
Discretion to Award Fees Under § 285 
When analyzed together, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Octane 
and Highmark completely reject the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture 
framework. Section 285, the Court declared, “imposes one and only one 
constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent 
litigation: The power is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.”125 Because 
that discretion belongs to the district courts, appellate courts should 
review awards under § 285 for abuse of discretion.126 The term 
“exceptional cases” is not defined by the statute, so the Court instructed 
lower courts to interpret it “in accordance with [its] ordinary 
meaning.”127 In other words, courts should do what they always do when 
confronted with ambiguous statutory language: they should use common 
120. Id. at 1748 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1988)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
121. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1749 (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 1748 n.2 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“A 
district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the 
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”)). 
125. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56 
(2014). 
126. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
127. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 
(2013)) (alteration in original). 
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sense,128 and look to dictionaries129 and similar language in other 
provisions.130 
Demonstrating the process by looking at dictionaries—both modern 
and contemporary to the 1952 Act—the Court listed definitions of the 
word “exceptional.”131 According to the Court, “exceptional” means 
“uncommon,” “rare,” “not ordinary,” “unusual,” “out of the ordinary 
course,” and “special.”132 The Court also looked to how courts 
interpreted the term “exceptional” in trademark litigation, using the 
phrase “not run-of-the-mill.”133 
In its holding in Octane, the Court proclaimed that “an ‘exceptional’ 
case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the 
substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the 
governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in 
which the case was litigated.”134 Thus, under § 285, district courts have 
the discretion to declare a case exceptional, and award fees, if it is either 
substantively weak, based on either the law or the facts of the case, or if 
it was litigated in an unreasonable manner.135 The applicable burden of 
proof is preponderance of the evidence—not clear and convincing 
evidence.136 Furthermore, district courts should not fear that awards of 
attorney fees under § 285 will easily be reversed, because—as Highmark 
explains—the Federal Circuit may only overturn such awards for abuse 
of discretion.137 
128. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip J. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354–55 (1990) (“Textual analysis starts with the specific words 
of the statutory provision being interpreted. The interpreter should approach the statutory text as a 
reasonably intelligent reader would and give the text its most commonsensical reading.”). 
129. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 
353 (2010) (“Because dictionaries report common usage, the dictionary rule supports consulting 
widely used dictionary definitions of terms the legislature has not defined.”); id. at 355 (“Consulting 
a dictionary is often the default primary route for interpreters to reveal the ‘common and approved 
usage of the language’ . . . .”). 
130. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 128, at 355 (noting that “the Court will sometimes look 
to similar provisions in other statutes, especially those regulating similar things.”); Octane, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1756 (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) for its interpretation of “the term ‘exceptional’ in the Lanham Act’s identical fee-shifting 
provision”). 
131. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar–B–Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.) (interpreting “exceptional” in the identical language 
in § 35(a) of the Lanham Act)). 
134. Id. at 1756. 
135. Id. (emphasis added). 
136. Id. at 1758. 
137. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014). 
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III. EARLY DECISIONS APPLYING OCTANE AND HIGHMARK 
OFFER HOPE FOR MORE FREQUENT FEE AWARDS 
The decisions in Octane and Highmark were highly anticipated.138 
Following their announcement, federal district courts at once began to 
apply the new standard for awards of attorney fees. The goal of this Part 
is to collect and evaluate § 285 attorney-fees cases under the new regime 
articulated in Octane and Highmark in order to provide insight into how 
litigants may take advantage of the apparently widening opportunity to 
receive an award of fees. Part III.A outlines the process through which 
this issue was approached. Part III.B presents a brief review of that 
research. Finally, Part III.C contains an abbreviated analysis of the 
results and clarifies the limits of the data. 
A. Overview of Methodology 
Research for this Note began in June 2014. The first step was to find 
and collect each decision interpreting § 285. Because not every case 
appears in each database, the author carried out searches in 
WestlawNext, LEXIS Advance, and Bloomberg Law. A few 
unpublished orders were passed to the author by colleagues. Once the 
cases were collected, they were read and sorted by court of decision, 
party seeking fees, success of fee award, and type of case (i.e., 
infringement, declaratory judgment of non-infringement, etc.). In the 
third step, the data was correlated to make it as useful as possible. 
Decisions continue to be released, so the results were routinely updated 
and revised. In order to prepare this Note for publication, it was 
necessary to “cut off” attempts to update. The results summarized here 
include cases announced as of December 31, 2014. 
As with any survey, the findings presented in this Note should be 
understood in context. It should be evident, first of all, that the total 
number of cases decided so far under the Octane and Highmark standard 
is relatively small. It would be unwise to attempt to use this sample to 
predict the outcome of a particular attorney-fee motion. This caveat is 
especially important when one takes into account the fact that the newly 
articulated standard explicitly requires a case-by-case, totality-of-the-
circumstances evaluation of the evidence. 
138. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court’s New Patent Cases, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/the-supreme-court-today-granted-two-petitions-for-writ-of-
certiorari-in-patent-related-cases-appealed-from-the-court-of-appea.html (summarizing case history 
and the potential impact of the decision); Mary Pat Dwyer, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sep. 5, 2013, 8:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/petition-of-the-day-471/ (indicating 
that Octane had been selected as the “petition of the day”); Norris, supra note 88. 
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It is also important to keep in mind as well that each of the underlying 
cases to which the attorney-fee motions are connected was initiated long 
before the Supreme Court’s Octane decision.139 In many of these 
examples, therefore, the litigation conduct at issue, and even the decision 
whether or not to seek fees, took place before Octane when the prior 
Brooks Furniture standard prevailed. By extension, therefore, perhaps 
some of the earliest successful awards would have been granted 
regardless of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement.140 As courts 
and litigants become more comfortable with the newly expanded 
interpretation, however, there is every indication that parties—especially 
defendants—can expect more success when seeking fees. 
Despite its limitations, this analysis should be helpful to litigants in 
patent suits going forward. In particular, it may prove beneficial as 
parties decide whether to seek fees, as well as how to frame arguments 
in support of fees. 
B. Survey of Decisions Interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 285 Following 
Octane and Highmark 
Research reveals that between April 29, 2014 (the day the Octane and 
Highmark decisions were announced) and December 31, 2014, judges in 
twenty-four federal district courts have ruled on attorney-fee motions 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 in fifty-five cases.141 Of those fifty-five decisions, 
139. Although a variety of factors affect the length of time it takes for patent suits to arrive at 
resolution, research suggests that the average “time-to-trial has remained relatively steady, at about 
2.5 years, since 2005.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: AS CASE 
VOLUME LEAPS, DAMAGES CONTINUE TO DECLINE 16 (2014), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/2014-patent-litigation-study.jhtml. For 
those patent suits that went to trial in the last quarter of 2013, the average time to trial was 1135 
days. LEX MACHINA, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2014), available at 
https://lexmachina.com/2014/05/patent-litigation-review/. 
140. See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Normark Corp., No. 10-cv-2140-CMC, 2014 WL 5474589 
(D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2014) (reconsidering award of attorney fees that had been granted prior to Octane 
and Highmark and increasing amount of award). 
141. Action Star Enters. v. Kaiject Tech. Int’l, No. 2:12-cv-08074 BRO (MRWX) (C.D. Cal. July 
7, 2014); Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. v. Johnson, No. 5:13-cv-1136-TMP, 2014 WL 4388425 
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2014); Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 12-256 
(RMB/JS), 2014 WL 7336766 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2014), amended and superseded by 2015 WL 
108415 (D. Del. Jan. 5, 2015); Ceiva Logic Inc. v. Frame Media Inc., No. SACV 08-00636-JVS 
(RNBx), 2014 WL 7338840 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014); Chalumeau Power Sys. LLC v. Alcatel-
Lucent, No. 11-1175-RGA, 2014 WL 4675002 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014); Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 
Inc. v. Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 07 C 623, 2014 WL 6978644 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014); Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2014 WL 2069653 (D. Md. May 14, 
2014); Cognex Corp. v. Microscan Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-2027 (JSR), 2014 WL 2989975 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 30, 2014); CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc., No. 11-CV-6635-LHK, 2014 WL 2508386 (N.D. 
Cal. June 3, 2014); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., No. 09-cv-261-wmc, 2014 WL 
7409503 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 31, 2014); EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 12-cv-
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twenty-six (i.e., roughly forty-seven percent) resulted in an award of 
attorney fees. 
 
01011-JST, 2014 WL 3726170 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014); EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. FLO TV 
Inc., No. 10-812-RGA, 2014 WL 2196418 (D. Del. May 27, 2014); Gametek LLC v. Zynga, Inc., 
No. CV 13-2546 RS, 2014 WL 4351414 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014); Gevo, Inc. v. Butamax 
Advanced Biofuels LLC, No. 13-576-SLR, 2014 WL 4247735 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2014); Home 
Gambling Network, Inc. v. Piche, No. 2:05-CV-610-DAE, 2014 WL 2170600 (D. Nev. May 21, 
2014); H-W Tech., Inc. v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0636-G (BH), 2014 WL 4378750 
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2014); Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. Sharp Corp., No. 10 C 6763, 2014 WL 
2443871 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2014); Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., No. 08-00874-
RGA, 2014 WL 5786668 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2014); IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Taridium, LLC, 
No. 12-CV-5251 (KAM) (SMG), 2014 WL 4437294 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014); IPVX Patent 
Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, No. 5:13-cv-01708 HRL, 2014 WL 5795545 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 
2014); JS Prods., Inc. v. Kabo Tool Co., No. 2:11-cv-01856-RCJ-GWF, 2014 WL 7336063 (D. 
Nev. Dec. 22, 2014); Kaneka Corp. v. Zhejiang Med. Co., No. 2:11-cv-02389-MRP-SS, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 91659 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); Keystone Global LLC v. Auto Essentials Inc., No. 12 
Civ. 9077(DLC)(GWG), 2014 WL 4897104 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014); Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense 
Corp., No. C 10-02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014); Lendingtree, LLC v. 
Zillow, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00439-FDW-DCK, 2014 WL 5147551 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2014); Linex 
Tech., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-159 CW, 2014 WL 4616847 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 
2014); Logic Devices, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. C 13-02943 WHA, 2014 WL 6844821 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 4, 2014); Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014); Medtrica Solutions Ltd. v. Cygnus Medical LLC, No. 12-CV-538 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 
2014); Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum USA, Inc., No. 06 C 6329, 2014 WL 3724797 
(N.D. Ill. July 28, 2014); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 10-12079-NMG, 
2014 WL 6481668 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2014); Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, No. 2:04-
cv-1223, 2014 WL 4775374 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2014); Parallel Iron LLC v. NetApp Inc., No. 12-
769-RGA, 2014 WL 4540209 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014); Pragmatus Telecom LLC v. Newegg Inc., 
No. 12-1533-RGA, 2014 WL 3724138 (D. Del. July 25, 2014); Precision Links Inc. v. USA Prods. 
Grp., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00576-MR, 2014 WL 2861759 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2014); Pure Fishing, 
Inc. v. Normark Corp., No. 10-cv-2140-CMC, 2014 WL 5474589 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2014); Rates 
Tech., Inc. v. Broadvox Holding Co., No. 13 Civ. 0152(SAS), 2014 WL 5023354 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 
2014); Realtime Data, LLC v. CME Grp., Inc., No. 11-cv-6697-KBF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91051 
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2014); Rimlinger v. Shenyang 245 Factory, No. 2:13-CV-2051-JAD-NJK, 2014 
WL 2527147 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014); Robinson v. Bartlow, No. 3:12-cv-00024, 2014 WL 2468817 
(W.D. Va. June 3, 2014); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., No. 3:10cv1827(JBA), 2014 WL 
4073204 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2014); Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., LLC v. Trust Commercial 
Prods., No. 2:13-cv-02144-GMN-GWF, 2014 WL 4987878 (D. Nev. Aug. 22, 2014); Shire LLC v. 
Amneal Pharm., LLC, No. 11-3781 (SRC), 2014 WL 2861430 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014); Small v. 
Implant Direct Mfg. LLC, No. 06 Civ. 683(NRB), 2014 WL 5463621 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2014); 
SmartWater, Ltd. v. Applied DNA Scis., Inc., No 12-cv-05731, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120401 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014); Stragent LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:11-cv-421, 2014 WL 6756304 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2014); Summit Data Sys., LLC v. EMC Corp., No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 4955689 
(D. Del. Sept. 25, 2014); Tech. Advancement Grp., Inc. v. IvySkin, LLC, No. 2:13cv89, 2014 WL 
3501060 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2014); TNS Media Research, LLC v. TIVO Research & Analytics, Inc., 
No. 11 Civ. 4039(SAS), 2014 WL 5639930 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2014); TransPerfect Global v. 
Motionpoint Corp., No. C 10-2590 CW, 2014 WL 6068384 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014); Univ. of 
Manitoba v. Draeger Med., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-48, 2014 WL 7204839 (D.N.D. Dec. 17, 2014); 
WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL 4471412 (D. Mass. Sept. 8, 2014); W. 
Holdings Corp. v. Summers, No. 2:13-CV-144 TS, 2014 WL 4922628 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2014); 
Wiley v. Rocktenn CP, LLP, No. 4:12-cv-00226-KGB, 2014 WL 4929447 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 30, 
2014); Yufa v. TSI Inc., No. 09-cv-01315-KAW, 2014 WL 4071902 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014). 
 
                                                                                                                      
16 - Jones - Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  12:10 PM 
526 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:505 
Table 1 
District Decisions Under  
35 U.S.C. § 285 
Awards 
N.D. Cal. 9 5 
D. Del. 8 3 
S.D.N.Y. 7 3 
D. Nev. 4 2 
C.D. Cal. 3 2 
N.D. Ill. 3 2 
D.Mass. 2 1 
E.D.N.Y 2 0 
W.D.N.C. 2 2 
D. Ark. 1 0 
D. Conn. 1 1 
D. Md. 1 1 
D. Utah 1 0 
D.N.D. 1 0 
D.N.J. 1 0 
D.S.C. 1 1 
E.D. Tex. 1 0 
E.D. Va. 1 0 
N.D. Ala. 1 1 
N.D. Tex. 1 0 
S.D. Ohio 1 1 
W.D. Va. 1 0 
W.D. Wash. 1 1 








Defendants142 brought forty-two of the motions, and were successful 
in twenty cases (i.e., roughly forty-eight percent of the time). 
142. The term “defendant” in patent litigation may refer to either an alleged infringer or, in some 
cases, such as a suit for declaratory judgment of non-infringement, a patent holder. Because many 
patent suits involve counterclaims, a named plaintiff might stand as a defendant when it defends 
itself against counterclaims brought by the original defendant. See, e.g., TransPerfect Global, Inc. v. 
Motionpoint Corp., No. C10-2590 CW, 2014 WL 6068384 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014). For purposes 
of this analysis, the term “defendant” is used to refer to a party defending itself from the assertion of 
infringement, whether preemptively or in response to a suit filed by a patent-holding plaintiff. 
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Plaintiffs143 brought thirteen motions for fees, and won six times (i.e., 
roughly forty-six percent of the time). Overall, forty-seven percent of the 
attorney-fee motions were granted.144 
These early decisions suggest that defendants may be much more 
likely to recover fees under the newly articulated standard than they 
would have been previously. In the decade leading up to 2013, patentees 
(normally plaintiffs) benefited from seventy-one percent of fee awards 
under § 285, with the other twenty-nine percent going to defendants.145 
After Octane, by contrast, only twenty-three percent of awards went to 
plaintiffs, and the remaining seventy-seven percent went to defendants. 
 
Table 2 
Party Seeking Fees Attempts Awards 
Defendant 42 (76% of attempts) 20 (77% of awards) 








As observers might have anticipated, decisions in attorney-fee 
motions have concentrated in a relatively small number of districts. 
Three districts account for nearly half of all § 285 cases decided in the 
eight months following Octane. One district—the Northern District of 
California—has decided nine cases. The District of Delaware decided 
eight, and the Southern District of New York decided seven. 
 
Table 3 








143. The term “plaintiff” in patent litigation can refer to alleged infringers as well as patent 
holders in patent litigation. It can also refer to other persons who wish, for example, to have a patent 
corrected and to have their own names added as inventors. See, e.g., Falana v. Kent State Univ., No. 
5:08 CV 720, 2014 WL 3788695 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2014) (plaintiff sued for correction of 
inventorship and successfully won fees). For purposes of this analysis, the term “plaintiff” means a 
patent-holding party asserting its right, whether affirmatively or in response to a preemptive suit 
from an alleged infringer, to request a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. 
144. These findings are roughly similar to preliminary evaluations conducted by others during the 
same time period. See Andrew S. Baluch et al., Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Cases After Octane 
Fitness, 21 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP. 17 (2014). 
145. Vishnubhakat, supra note 56, at 25; see also Liang & Berliner, supra note 55, at 86–89 
(reporting that of the 208 attorney fee awards between 2003 and 2013, sixty-six (thirty-two percent) 
went to defendants, and 142 (sixty-eight percent) went to plaintiffs); James Bessen & Michael J. 
Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 80–81 & tbl. 6 (2012) 
(reporting that of the 137 attorney fee awards made between 1985 and 2004, twenty-eight (thirty-
two percent) went to defendants, and fifty-nine (sixty-six percent) went to plaintiffs). 
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Defendants Plaintiffs by 
Plaintiffs 
N.D. Cal. 9 8 5 (63%) 1 0 (0%) 
D. Del. 8 8 3 (38%) 0 0 














Apart from these three leading districts, one other—the District of 
Nevada—decided four cases. Five additional districts decided either two 
or three cases.146 The remaining fifteen districts have ruled on only one 
motion each. Noticeably underrepresented in this survey is the Eastern 
District of Texas. Although that district adjudicates approximately 
twenty-five percent of patent suits,147 as of December 31, 2014 it had 
announced only one attorney-fee decision under § 285 after the Supreme 
Court’s Octane and Highmark opinions.148 
C. Lessons from the Early Decisions 
The Supreme Court in Octane held that the decision whether or not to 
award fees is within the discretion of individual judges—not constrained 
by arbitrary or formulaic rules of precedent.149 The Court further 
elaborated in Highmark that the discretionary determination of 
exceptionality under § 285 is “multifarious and novel, not susceptible to 
useful generalization. . . .”150 It is not possible, therefore, to articulate a 
146. See supra Table 1. 
147. Of the 6092 patent cases filed in 2013, 1495 were filed in the Eastern District of Texas. LEX 
MACHINA, supra note 139, at 1–2. The Eastern District of Texas has often been referred to as a 
“Rocket Docket” for patent litigation. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket 
Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 58, 64–67 (2011). 
148. Stragent LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:11-cv-421, 2014 WL 6756304 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014). 
Although no other Eastern District of Texas cases were counted, that district did announce a 
decision roughly two weeks after Octane and Highmark in which it declined to reconsider a 
previously decided denial of fees. Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 
WL 1904228, at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) (declining to reconsider motion for fees and 
commenting that the movant had “urged [the] Court to apply the Federal Circuit test for section 285 
attorney fee motions, not the more liberal test urged by the petitioner in Octane Fitness and 
ultimately adopted by the Court”). 
149. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1748, 1755–56 
(2014) (holding that the patent act’s fee-shifting statute “imposes one and only one constraint on 
district courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation: The power is reserved for 
‘exceptional’ cases”). 
150. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748–49 
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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single formula from the emerging case law that will predict when fees 
will, and will not, be awarded. Indeed, the Supreme Court eschewed just 
such a rigid construction when it overruled Brooks Furniture.151 As the 
Court explained, “[a]lthough questions of law may in some cases be 
relevant to the § 285 inquiry, that inquiry generally is, at heart, ‘rooted in 
factual determinations.’”152 An attempt to provide a case-by-case review 
of the recently decided cases quickly devolves into a list of facts that, 
although informed by the law, will never precisely match the factual 
scenario in an open dispute.153 This is not to say that the emerging cases 
have no value. On the contrary, several relevant questions of law154 have 
been addressed and clarified. Some of these will be addressed briefly 
below. 
First, the recently expanded freedom to declare “exceptional cases” 
has not affected courts’ definition of “prevailing party.” As the statute 
explains, awards of attorney fees under § 285 may only go to the 
prevailing party. The phrase, “prevailing party,” is not defined by the 
statute and it is not uncommon in patent litigation for plaintiffs to 
succeed on some of their claims while losing others.155 
The Federal Circuit has explained that it should be construed in 
essentially the same manner as it would in other contexts, such as when 
awarding costs and fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(1).156 The Federal Circuit recently expounded on its standard for 
determining when a party is the “prevailing party” under § 285. “To be 
the ‘prevailing party,’ we require: (1) that the party ‘received at least 
some relief on the merits,’ and (2) ‘[t]hat relief must materially alter the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying one party’s behavior 
in a way that ‘directly benefits’ the opposing party.’”157 Even after 
Octane and Highmark, a defendant cannot be declared a prevailing 
party, and expect a fee award, when the plaintiff simply fails 
successfully to pursue its claims and the matter is dismissed without 
prejudice.158 Likewise, courts will not classify a defendant as the 
151. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (describing Brooks Furniture as an “overly rigid . . . formulation 
[that] superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible”). 
152. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. 
155. See, e.g., SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1077–78 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(reviewing case history and mentioning that some, but not all, of plaintiff’s willful infringement 
claims were successful and that the district court judge declined to designate plaintiff as the 
prevailing party). 
156. See id. at 1086. 
157. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
158. See Robinson v. Bartlow, No. 3:12-cv-00024, 2014 WL 2468817 (W.D. Va. June 3, 2014). 
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prevailing party when a case is dismissed after the parties realize that the 
defendant’s allegedly infringing conduct is covered by a license (or 
sublicense) granted by the plaintiff to a third party.159 
Second, even if a party suspects from the outset that a case is 
exceptional, courts will probably not rule on the issue of exceptionality 
until after the case is finally decided on the merits. Even when pleadings 
signify that a case is extraordinarily weak, courts cannot evaluate the 
totality of the circumstances until the litigation has run its course and a 
prevailing party has been declared.160 This question has arisen when 
defendants ask judges to require plaintiffs to post a bond that will cover 
the expected attorney fee award. Some of the discussion about patent 
reform in the years prior to Octane and Highmark—including some of 
the recent legislative proposals—unsuccessfully sought to require a bond 
or undertaking at the outset of every patent suit.161 So far, courts have 
not been willing impose such a requirement under the existing § 285.162 
As many have observed, a large proportion of patent infringement 
lawsuits involve so-called Non Practicing Entities (NPEs)163—
companies that are “not actually in business using patents but merely 
own[] them to collect royalties and damages.”164 Many NPEs operate as 
159. See Pragmatus Telecom LLC v. Newegg Inc., No. 12-1533-RGA, 2014 WL 3724138, at *9 
(D. Del. July 25, 2014) (explaining that “[i]f there were a prevailing party, it would seem that it 
would more likely be [the plaintiff], as [plaintiff] filed suit because it believed that its patent was 
infringed, and as a result, in part because of the suit, [plaintiff] was able to negotiate a license 
covering potential infringement of its asserted patent”); Parallel Iron LLC v. NetApp Inc., No. 12-
769-RGA, 2014 WL 4540209 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014) (citing Pragmatus Telecom, 2014 WL 
3724138, and holding that defendant’s acquisition of a license (or sublicense) to use allegedly 
infringing technology is insufficient to qualify the defendant as a prevailing party in a patent 
infringement suit). 
160. See, e.g., IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet, LLC, No. 5:13-CV-01708 HRL, 2014 
WL 2772297, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (clarifying that “Section 285 addresses fee-shifting 
that occurs at the conclusion of a case”). Although the court declined to award fees at the outset, the 
defendant ultimately prevailed in the case and received an award of fees totaling $820,642. IPVX 
Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, No. 5:13-cv-01708 HRL, 2014 WL 5795545 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 6, 2014). 
161. See Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. § 201(a). This particular 
attempt at reform was “declared all but dead” in May 2014. Edward Wyatt, Legislation to Protect 
Against “Patent Trolls” Is Shelved, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2014, at B2. 
162. See, e.g., IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet, LLC, No. 5:13-CV-01708 HRL, 2014 
WL 2772297, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion to require plaintiff “to 
post an undertaking in the amount of $749,000 to cover attorney’s fees and costs that [defendant] 
expects to incur through claim construction and early summary judgment proceedings”). 
163. NPEs, also called Patent Assertion Entities or, pejoratively, “patent trolls,” filed nearly two-
thirds of patent infringement lawsuits in 2013. RPX CORP., 2013 NPE LITIGATION REPORT 4 (2014). 
Additionally, “20% of identified decisions in 2013 involved NPE patent holders, reflecting the 
much higher tendency for NPE-filed cases to settle or be dismissed.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
supra note 139, at 2. 
164. Norris, supra note 138. 
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shell companies with few assets other than the patents they assert. The 
fear is that ordering an NPE to pay attorney fees at the end of a suit 
could be futile if the company simply “throws up its hands, declares 
bankruptcy, and walks away.”165 Requiring the plaintiff to post a bond at 
the outset would, in theory, mitigate that risk, but the only known 
attempt was unsuccessful.166 
Finally, courts will probably not view a plaintiff’s decision to 
continue pursuing a case despite an adverse claim construction ruling—
by itself—as enough to classify the case as exceptional.167 Claim 
construction is an important phase of most patent infringement suits in 
which the district court judge construes the language of the patent 
“including the terms of art within its claim” as a matter of law.168 This 
process is alternatively known as a Markman hearing, after the 1996 
Supreme Court decision from which the process derives, Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc.169 
Once the district court has construed the claims of the patent as a 
matter of law, the finder of fact can decide whether the alleged 
infringer’s activities actually infringed the patent by “mak[ing], us[ing], 
offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing the] patented invention, within the United 
States . . . during the term of the patent therefor.”170 Infringement suits 
are normally resolved quickly after claim construction.171 It is commonly 
understood, however, that “[a] claim construction ruling alone does not 
suffice to end a case at the trial court.”172 Claim construction rulings are 
often argued at appeal, so it is not always unreasonable for a plaintiff to 
press forward with a claim despite an unfavorable Markman ruling at the 
trial court, especially since such determinations are reviewed de novo by 
165. Charles Duan, Opinion, Patent Trolls Are the Economy-Suffocating Exception to the “No 
Free Lunch” Rule, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2013/11/15/patent-trolls-are-the-economy-suffocating-exception-to-the-no-free-lunch-rule/. 
166. IPVX Patent Holdings, 2014 WL 2772297. 
167. See, e.g., Kaneka Corp. v. Zhejiang Med. Co., No. 2:11-cv-02389-MRP-SS, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 91659, at *10–14 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); Realtime Data, LLC v. CME Group, Inc., 11-
cv-6697-KBF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91051, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2014) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that plaintiff ought to have dropped its claims following claim construction and explaining 
that plaintiff’s conduct was not “so extreme or unreasonable that this case stands out from others”). 
168. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
169. Id. 
170. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
171. REBECCA N. EYRE, JOE S. CECIL & ERIC TOPOR, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 22 (2008) (reporting that fifty 
percent of cases surveyed were resolved on summary judgment, injunctive relief, or “settled without 
further decisions on the merits” following claim construction). 
172. Kaneka, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91659, at *11 (citing Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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the Federal Circuit.173 Once a court does reach a final decision in the 
case, however, it will probably not postpone deciding the issue of 
exceptionality until after appeals are heard.174 
The landscape for shifting fees is shifting, and it is likely that attorney 
fee awards—particularly for defendants—will become more common 
going forward. As decisions continue to be released, and as courts 
become more comfortable with their newly expanded discretionary 
authority, the insights presented in this Note may enable practitioners to 
take advantage of the opportunity to seek fees under § 285 and more 
precisely to focus their arguments. 
Octane and Highmark have the potential dramatically to impact 
patent litigation in the future. This brief overview of the emerging 
decisions demonstrates the limits of that impact and illuminates the 
highly fact-dependent nature of attorney-fee determinations. Not every 
aspect of patent litigation—such as the definition of “prevailing party”—
has been, or is likely to be, impacted. It is important for litigators to 
recognize how and when to frame their arguments for fees and avoid 
disputes over issues that are unlikely to yield benefit, despite the 
apparently changing climate. 
IV. FOLLOWING OCTANE AND HIGHMARK, PARTIES IN 
PATENT LITIGATION SHOULD MORE AGGRESSIVELY 
SEEK ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 285 
In the wake of Octane and Highmark, district courts enjoy broader 
discretion to declare a case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
Moreover, they need not fear that their decisions will be easily reversed 
under a de novo review by the Federal Circuit. Under the newly 
articulated standard, prevailing parties may be awarded attorney fees if 
their opponents’ cases are either substantively weak, based on the law or 
the facts of the individual cases, or if the cases were litigated in an 
unreasonable manner.175 To take advantage of the expanded opportunity 
to seek attorney fees under § 285, this Note suggests that defendants in 
173. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (en banc). But see Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., __U.S.__, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 
(2015) (holding that while the Federal Circuit should “review the district court’s ultimate 
construction of the claim de novo . . . to overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual 
dispute, the Court of Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made 
a clear error” (emphasis added)). 
174. See Linex Tech., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No C 13-159 CW, 2014 WL 4616847, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that court should delay making § 285 
attorney fee decision). 
175. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 
(2014). 
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patent litigation should (1) strive to inform courts of their expanded 
authority to shift fees; and (2) focus their arguments on the text of § 285 
using common sense, while avoiding analogizing to other “exceptional 
cases.” 
A. Defendants in Patent Suits Should Strive to Inform District Court 
Judges that Awarding Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 Is Now Within 
the Courts’ Discretion 
In Octane, the Supreme Court held that § 285 “imposes one and only 
one constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees in 
patent litigation: The power is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.”176 
Despite the Court’s acknowledgement of broad discretionary authority in 
this area, many judges may still be hesitant to grant attorney-fee 
motions.177 As one judge put it, “application of the American Rule 
remains the well-established presumption even in patent cases, and this 
Court will not depart from it lightly.”178 Thus, when confronted by a 
“close case,” many judges will presumably “exercise [their] discretion 
not to award attorney’s fees.”179 
There are a number of possible explanations for this attitude. It may 
stem from unfamiliarity with the complexities of patent litigation, for 
instance, or from fear of having a decision overturned—especially in 
light of the recently overruled line of cases following the Brooks 
Furniture framework. Alternatively, it may simply be general discomfort 
with the notion of shifting fees. To overcome this reluctance, parties—
especially defendants—should actively seek to remind district court 
judges about the availability of fee awards, and judges should freely 
exercise their authority to grant fees without fear of being easily 
overruled when they decide to do so. 
In American civil litigation generally, awards of attorney fees are 
rare. Indeed, requiring each party to pay its own fees in most instances is 
a “bedrock principle” of litigation in this country.180 But in Octane and 
Highmark, the Supreme Court undeniably held that district courts have 
broad authority to award attorney fees in patent suits. In doing so, it 
176. Id. at 1755–56. 
177. See, e.g., Wiley v. Rocktenn CP, LLC, No. 4:12-cv-00226-KGB, 2014 WL 4929447, at *6 
(D. Ark. Sept. 30, 2014) (holding that case was not exceptional and explaining that “[e]ven if this 
case were an exceptional case . . . this Court would exercise its discretion and decline to award 
fees”). 
178. EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 12–cv–01011–JST, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 101923, at *19 (D. Del. July 25, 2014). 
179. Id. at *23. 
180. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010). 
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signaled that § 285 should not lie dormant: the statute is meant to be 
used.181 But, because the change is so new, and because most district 
court judges see relatively few patent cases,182 it should not be surprising 
that individual judges may not fully understand how § 285 applies in the 
complex world of patent litigation. Judges may not, in fact, even be 
aware of the statute at all. It is up to the parties seeking fees, therefore, to 
inform courts about their newly broadened powers under Octane and 
Highmark, and to urge them to exercise those powers. 
As one strategy to accomplish this goal, parties should consider 
announcing their intention to seek fees during the early stages of 
litigation. An increasing number of defendants, for example, have begun 
asserting a request for attorney fees in their answer to the plaintiff’s 
complaint.183 While it would be improper for a court actually to rule on 
such an issue prior to the final resolution of the case,184 raising the issue 
from the outset reminds the court to be on the lookout for legal or factual 
weaknesses, and signals to the opposing party that the defendant is 
prepared to argue the issue when the time comes. 
Additionally, when moving for fees at the close of a case, parties 
181. This conclusion is apparent from the reasoning articulated by the Court in Octane. In 
Octane, the Court overruled Brooks Furniture in part because it was so restrictive as to make § 285 
meaningless, especially in light of the court’s inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct. See 
Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“We reject Brooks Furniture for another reason: It is so demanding that 
it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous.”). In removing Brooks Furniture’s “inflexible 
framework,” the Court freed district courts to “award fees in the rare case in which a party’s 
unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is nonetheless so 
‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of fees.” Id. at 1757. Additionally, the Court explained that trial 
courts should invoke the statute and award fees in “case[s] presenting either subjective bad faith or 
exceptionally meritless claims [that] sufficiently set [them] apart from mine-run cases to warrant a 
fee award.” Id. (emphasis added). 
182. As of this writing there are 677 sitting Federal District Court Judges, Federal Judgeships, 
USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), in the ninety-four federal districts, 18 U.S.C. § 133 (2012). Of the 6092 new 
patent cases filed in 2013, 2831 (i.e., over forty-six percent) were filed in just two districts: the 
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware. LEX MACHINA, supra note 139, at 2. And 
another 875 cases (i.e., over fourteen percent) were filed in just three districts: the Central, 
Northern, and Southern Districts of California. Id. The remaining 2386 (i.e., roughly thirty-nine 
percent) were spread over the other eighty-nine districts. 
183. See, e.g., Amended Answer of Defendant Google Inc. to First Amended Complaint for 
Patent Infringement at 7, SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 2:13-cv-937-JRG, 2014 WL 7406433 
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2014), ECF No. 32 (denying infringement and requesting fees and costs); 
Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s Answer and Counterclaims at 8, Viatech Tech., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 14-1226-RGA, 2014 WL 7442499 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2014), ECF No. 10; 
Wockhardt Bio Ag, Wockhardt Ltd. and Wockhardt USA, LLC’s Answer and Counterclaims at 34, 
Cephalon, Inc. v. Wockhardt Bio Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-01332-GMS, 2014 WL 7333567 (D. Del. Nov. 
13, 2014), ECF No. 12. 
184. See, e.g., IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet, LLC, No. 5:13-CV-01708 HRL, 2014 
WL 2772297, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (clarifying that “Section 285 addresses fee-shifting 
that occurs at the conclusion of a case”). 
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should base their arguments on the Supreme Court’s holding in Octane 
that “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in 
the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of 
the circumstances.”185 But they should also focus on the Court’s opinion 
in Highmark in which the Court constrained the Federal Circuit’s power 
to review fee awards and held that the appellate court “should apply an 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review in reviewing all aspects of a 
district court’s § 285 determination.”186 Emphasizing that district courts 
now possess both greater discretionary authority to interpret § 285 and 
greater freedom to exercise that authority may allay some of the 
apprehension about granting fee awards. 
Finally, and perhaps obviously, parties arguing for fees should do just 
that: argue for fees. A surprising number of cases failed because the 
moving party simply neglected to articulate why its opponent’s case was 
exceptional.187 As discussed more fully in Part VI.B, below, parties 
should strive to frame their arguments thoroughly, appealing to the 
court’s common sense. If the defense believes, for example, that the 
plaintiff has neglected to carry out sufficient pre-suit investigation, then 
it should explain to the court in detail what an appropriate investigation 
entails, and then identify how plaintiff’s conduct failed to meet that 
standard. Additionally, if the opposing counsel has engaged in 
particularly obstructive or vexatious behavior, the defendant should 
document and record such actions, appeal to the court’s desire to foster 
professionalism, and then communicate in detail how opposing 
counsel’s behavior deviated from standard notions of decorum. 
After Octane and Highmark, “there is no precise rule or formula for 
making [attorney fee] determinations.”188 As parties continue to invoke 
§ 285, and as courts become more comfortable shifting fees, a more 
185. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
186. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) 
(emphasis added). 
187. See, e.g., Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., Civ. Action No. 08-00874-RGA, 
2014 WL 5786668, at *14 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2014) (concluding that defendant offered no sufficient 
basis to declare the case exceptional and denying the motion for fees); CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, 
Inc., No. 11-CV-6635-LHK, 2014 WL 2508386, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014) (explaining that 
defendant’s characterization of plaintiff’s conduct as “obstructionist” was too simplistic and 
“unsupported by any analysis”); Small v. Implant Direct Mfg. LLC, No. 06 Civ. 683(NRB), 2014 
WL 5463621, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (commenting that “[m]ere assertions that a party’s 
arguments were without merit are generally unavailing”); IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Taridium 
LLC, No. 12-CV-5251 (KAM) (SMG), 2014 WL 4437294, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014) (denying 
plaintiff’s motion for fees because “[p]laintiff has not proffered any argument, nor can the Court 
anticipate any reasonable argument, as to why this case should be designated an ‘exceptional case’ 
for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees”). 
188. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
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robust framework may emerge. At this early stage, perhaps the simple 
suggestions presented here will advance that goal. 
B. Parties Seeking Fees Should Describe Their Cases as 
“Exceptional” by Focusing on the Text of § 285 and Appealing to 
the Court’s Common Sense 
The twin decisions in Octane and Highmark present a remarkable 
opportunity for parties in patent litigation, particularly defendants, to 
request and receive awards of attorney fees. This Note argues that 
litigants, particularly defendants, should embrace this opportunity and 
seek fees in appropriate circumstances. Because the issue of 
exceptionality is highly dependent on the unique facts of the case, courts 
and litigants should be cautious before comparing their cases to prior 
successful cases, as any deviation from such a case’s facts could prompt 
a court to deny a fees motion.189 Instead, litigants should focus their 
arguments on the text of § 285 and employ common sense argument. A 
few examples from the recent decisions illustrate these suggestions. 
1. Parties Seeking Fees Should Avoiding Comparing the Facts of 
Their Cases to “Prototypical Exceptional Cases” 
The Supreme Court explained that when evaluating a motion for 
attorney fees in a patent suit, “analysis begins and ends with the text of 
§ 285.”190 In order to describe cases as “exceptional,” litigants 
reasonably attempt to describe what constitutes normal conduct and then 
point out why their opponent has deviated from that normal course.191 
No two cases present identical factual scenarios, however, and it might 
be relatively simple to distinguish the prior case on its facts and leave 
the moving party with a negative ruling. As they argue for fees, 
therefore, litigants should refrain from comparing the facts of their cases 
to prior successful cases. An example from the Southern District of New 
York follows to illustrate. 
The first § 285 attorney-fee decision from the Southern District of 
New York following Octane and Highmark involved proceedings that, 
in the court’s view, constituted a “prototypical exceptional case.”192 The 
189. See, e.g., Small v. Implant Direct Mfg. LLC, No. 06 Civ. 683(NRB), 2014 WL 5463621, at 
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (distinguishing the case from Lumen View Tech., LLC v. 
Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and denying fees, in part because the 
plaintiff was “not a patent troll”). 
190. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
191. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
192. Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
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case had grabbed nationwide media attention as the defendant’s CEO, 
Kevin O’Connor, openly wrote about how he intended to “slaughter a 
patent troll.”193 After a judgment on the pleadings, the court granted 
defendant’s motion for attorney fees and explained that “[t]he question 
of whether this case is exceptional is not close.”194 The court explained 
that the plaintiff was a non-practicing entity motivated to sue only to 
“extract a nuisance settlement from [the defendant] on the theory that 
[defendant] would rather pay an unjustified license fee than bear the 
costs of the threatened expensive litigation.”195 The court summarized 
the conduct that prompted the exceptional case determination and, after 
applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the court determined that 
the lawsuit was “frivolous and objectively unreasonable.”196 In the 
court’s words, “fee shifting in this case will serve as an instrument of 
justice.”197 
Just a few months later, another judge in the Southern District of New 
York declined to award fees in the case of Small v. Implant Direct 
Manufacturing, LLC198 after distinguishing the facts of the case from 
Lumen View. The court in Small highlighted several fact-based 
indicators that, it perceived, tended to show that a case was exceptional 
in other post-Octane district court decisions. First, the court decided that 
the defendant had not sufficiently described the case as meritless “early 
in the litigation,” as the defendants in Lumen View and other cases 
had.199 Second, the court pointed out that Small, the plaintiff, was “not a 
patent troll,”200 like the plaintiff in Lumen View.201 The plaintiff was also 
not “guilty of any litigation misconduct . . . approaching that which 
193. Kevin O’Connor, How to Slaughter a Patent Troll in 5 Steps, PANDODAILY (July 26, 2013) 
http://pando.com/2013/07/26/how-to-slaughter-a-patent-troll-in-5-steps/. 
194. Lumen View, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 337. 
195. Id. at 336. 
196. Id. at 335. For additional information about the case background, see Joshua Brustein, Troll 
Fighting: Anatomy of a Patent Lawsuit, BUSINESSWEEK, (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-17/troll-fighting-anatomy-of-a-patent-lawsuit. 
197. Lumen View, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198. No. 06 Civ. 683(NRB), 2014 WL 5463621 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
199. Id. at *3 (citing Lumen View., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329; Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense Corp., C 
10–02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014); H–W Tech., Inc. v. Overstock.com, 
Inc., 3:12–CV–0636–G BH, 2014 WL 4378750 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2014)). The court reasoned that, 
“although Octane reduced the showing required for an award on the ground of objective 
baselessness, courts continue to hold claims of baselessness to a high bar.” Id.  
200. “Patent troll” is a commonly used pejorative term for a Non-Practicing Entity (NPE)—a 
company that is “not actually in business using patents but merely owns them to collect royalties 
and damages.” Norris, supra note 88. 
201. Small, 2014 WL 543621, at *4 (reasoning that “the need for the deterrent impact of a fee 
award is greater where there is evidence that the plaintiff is a ‘patent troll’ or has engaged in 
extortive litigation” (citing Lumen View, 24 F. Supp. 3d 329)). 
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would be sanctionable under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 11.”202 
Because the court was easily able to distinguish Lumen View and other 
prior cases on their facts, the court found that the case was not 
exceptional, and declined to award attorney fees—even though the court 
had explicitly stated in a previous opinion that the case “present[ed] an 
atypical, if not unique set of facts.”203 
Because no two cases involve identical factual scenarios, the Supreme 
Court explicitly held that § 285 should be interpreted using a case-by-
case, totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation.204 Under the new 
framework laid out by the Court, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
point to the facts of a prior successful case in order to win an award of 
attorney fees under § 285. Instead of relying on analogies to prior 
successful cases when framing motions for fees—and risking failure 
when the prior cases are distinguished on their facts—parties should 
follow the example set by the Supreme Court in Octane and focus on the 
text of § 285.205 
2. Fee-Seeking Parties Should Focus Their Arguments on the Text of 
§ 285 and Appeal to Common Sense 
Octane presents a straightforward method for evaluating attorney fee 
motions under § 285: “analysis begins and ends with the text of 
§ 285.”206 Instead of relying on analogies to prior successful cases when 
framing motions for fees, therefore, parties should follow the example 
set by the Supreme Court in Octane and focus on language of the 
statute.207 The key term in § 285, Justice Sotomayor explained, is the 
word “exceptional.”208 “Exceptional” is the adjectival form of the word 
“exception,” which comes from the Latin word excipere meaning “to 
take out.”209 As the Court noted, “exceptional” means “uncommon,” 
“rare,” “not ordinary,” “unusual,” “out of the ordinary course,” 
“special,” and “not run-of-the-mill.”210 Additional synonyms include 
202. Id. (citing H–W Tech., Inc. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 3:12–CV–0636–G BH, 2014 WL 
4378750 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2014)). 
203. Id. 
204. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 
(2014). 
205. Id. at 1755 (instructing that analysis of § 285 “begins and ends with the text of § 285”). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 1755–56 (holding that § 285 “imposes one and only one constraint on district courts’ 
discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation: The power is reserved for ‘exceptional’ 
cases”). 
209. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 791 (1993 ed.). 
210. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar–B–Que Rest., 771 
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“atypical,” “abnormal,” “surprising,” and “weird.”211 In ordinary usage, 
the word connotes a deviation from what is usual or expected. Virtually 
anything can be exceptional, therefore, if it is somehow unlike others in 
a group.212 In the litigation context, parties who wish to describe their 
case as exceptional must establish a conceptual pattern, and then 
demonstrate why the law or facts of the particular case deviate from that 
pattern using common sense. 
The case of Kilopass Technology Inc. v. Sidense Corp.,213 out of the 
Northern District of California, is an example of a decision that did not 
outline a set of factors from prior decisions in order to justify an 
exceptional-case determination, or try to distinguish the facts of the case 
from other § 285 cases. Instead, in that case the court simply evaluated 
“both the substantive strength of [the plaintiff’s] litigating position and 
the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated”214 to determine 
whether the case “[stood] out from others.”215 The court weighed the 
strength of the plaintiff’s claims and found them to be “objectively 
baseless.”216 The court held that the plaintiff had litigated the case “in an 
unreasonable manner by failing to conduct an adequate pre-filing 
investigation, shifting its theories of infringement late in the litigation 
and without following the proper procedures for amendment of 
contentions, and engaging in conduct that at times amounted to 
gamesmanship.”217 Rather than comparing and contrasting the case with 
other patent suits, the court simply looked to “the totality of the 
circumstances” and concluded that the case was “an ‘exceptional’ case 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.”218 Unlike the court in Small, the Kilopass court 
rebuffed the notion that identifying the plaintiff as an NPE “is relevant to 
the determination of whether a case is ‘exceptional’ under § 285.”219 
From these examples, parties can see that it may be unwise to try to 
cast the facts of a case in light of another case. It is not enough simply to 
F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.) (interpreting “exceptional” 
in the identical language in § 35(a) of the Lanham Act)). 
211. CONCISE OXFORD AMERICAN THESAURUS 278 (2006 ed.). 
212. For example, the U.S. President has ten days to sign a bill after presentment from Congress, 
“Sundays excepted.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. In a more everyday scenario, a shop window might 
have a sign that reads: “Open every day except Sunday.” In both of these situations Sunday is 
exceptional. 
213. No. C 10-02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). 
214. Id. at *9 (citing Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756). 
215. Id. (quoting Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756). 
216. Id. at *14. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. n.15. 
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assert that the opponent is a “patent troll.”220 Instead, a party should 
simply focus on the text of the fee-shifting statute and then use common 
sense to explain how the case deviates from court’s overall experience 
with litigation practices in general. Parties should explain to the court 
why relying on certain types of expert testimony in the pre-filing stage is 
unreasonable,221 or point out why strategic decisions cross the ordinary 
bounds of civil litigation practice.222 In essence, parties should urge 
judges to gauge whether the strength of the claims asserted by opposing 
parties and the manner in which they are pursued conform to the 
ordinary levels of civility, candor, and professionalism. Any deviation 
from ordinary practices is, arguably, “exceptional,” and litigants should 
not hesitate to bring such actions to the court’s attention. 
The field of patent litigation is highly specialized and, many would 
say, altogether different from other fields of civil litigation.223 Some may 
be concerned that the average district court judge around the country, 
who rarely hears a patent case, will not have enough experience with 
patent litigation to determine whether litigation conduct is unreasonable 
or not without a more formulaic interpretation structure, and will not be 
able to apply § 285 fairly and uniformly.224 Additionally, as Justice Alito 
mentioned during the Octane oral arguments, patent litigators are 
perceived, as a group, to be a bit “different” from others.225 This 
concern, however, is probably not much more than a paper tiger. In the 
eight months since Octane and Highmark judges in twenty-four different 
federal districts have decided § 285 attorney-fee cases.226 Federal judges 
see parties from all walks of life and attorneys from every level of 
experience and competence. Furthermore, they adjudicate disputes 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at *14. 
222. Id. at *15 (describing the plaintiff’s conduct of shifting theories as “gamesmanship”). 
223. See William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of Law: An Empirical 
Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 364 (2011) 
(explaining that “contemporary patent litigation may present a particularly challenging ethical 
landscape precisely because the cases can be complex, involve extraordinary numbers of 
documents, have multiple layers of attorneys involved, and also because the stakes in this type of 
litigation are often very high for both clients and their lawyers”). 
224. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184) (Justice Alito: “[S]ay I’m a district judge 
someplace and I rarely get a patent case. How am I supposed to determine whether the case is 
exceptional if the standard is take everything into account, litigation misconduct, the strength of the 
case, any indication of bad faith, and decide whether it’s exceptional? Exceptional compared to 
what? I have very little basis for comparison. How do I do that?”). 
225. Id. at 13; see also Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum USA, Inc., No. 06 C 6329, 2014 
WL 3724797, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2014) (“The Court notes that patent lawyers love to litigate 
aggressively and this was no exception on both sides.”). 
226. See supra Part III.B. 
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relating to novel and complex issues of law spanning the entire spectrum 
of issues on a daily basis. There is no reason to presume, therefore, that 
courts will be unable to recognize legal or factual weaknesses in cases 
when they see them, so long as parties take the time carefully to aid the 
court in sifting through often complicated technical details that are the 
substance of most patent cases. 
Courts can also recognize when parties—even those with legitimate 
claims—have chosen to pursue an unreasonable litigation strategy. For 
example, a recent case in the Northern District of California, Linex 
Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard, Co.,227 involved the following 
string of events. The plaintiff brought suit in the Eastern District of 
Texas against a multitude of defendants alleging that an industry 
standard technology infringed upon a patent it had acquired.228 After the 
claim construction ruling, plaintiff settled the suit with the defendants, 
but then returned to the Patent and Trademark Office to seek a reissue of 
the patent—to broaden its scope.229 Subsequently, the plaintiff refiled 
the suit in the District of Delaware, but requested a stay while a claim 
against the same defendants arising from the same patents was heard 
before the International Trade Commission (ITC)—despite awareness 
that the plaintiff could not establish domestic industry.230 And then, after 
abandoning the ITC claim, seeing the suit transferred to yet another 
district, and ultimately losing on summary judgment of non-
infringement.231 
The defendants framed their argument for fees in the simplest manner 
227. Linex Tech., Inc. v. Helwett-Packard Co., No C 13-159 CW, 2014 WL 4616847 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
228. Id. at *1. 
229. Id. 
230. The United States ITC “is an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad 
investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.” About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). Entities that own 
intellectual property regularly initiate investigative actions against alleged infringers in the ITC to 
seek “exclusion orders,” prohibitions on importing infringing products into the United States, under 
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). The ITC is not a federal court and it operates with different laws and 
mandates, “most important among these being the mandate to protect domestic industry from 
‘unfair trade practices’ under the trade acts enacted and amended throughout the twentieth century.” 
Taras M. Czebiniak, Note, When Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do You Wear? Choosing 
Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in § 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 93, 93 (2011). The ITC was created to protect domestic industry, so patent owners that 
try to protect their intellectual property in that forum have been required, traditionally, to prove they 
have a domestic industry to protect. This is a troublesome task for NPEs, because, as the term non-
practicing-entity expresses, they are not in the business of producing goods. This leaves the ITC 
with the dilemma of whether to “protect intellectual property rights or protect the domestic 
industry.” Id. at 94. 
231. See Linex, 2014 WL 4616847, at *1–2. 
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possible, asserting that the plaintiff’s identical claims were “pursued in 
three different courts on three different occasions with substantially 
similar results”232 and that doing so was exceptional. The court agreed, 
and held that the plaintiff, a self-described “three-person think tank,”233 
“knew or should have known that its . . . claims were meritless as 
asserted.”234 The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s attempts to pursue 
essentially the same claims through three different fora—along with its 
“repeated[] attempt[s] to broaden the reach of its patents to capture 
technology it knew it did not invent”235—made the case exceptional, and 
an award of fees was justified.236 Using common sense, the court 
evaluated the plaintiff’s claims and conduct to conclude that they were 
unreasonable. The court did not attempt to find factual precedent for 
each element of the defendants’ exceptionality arguments. On the 
contrary, the court accepted that the Supreme Court meant what it said in 
Octane, that the evaluation should be based on the totality of the 
circumstances without any “precise rule or formula.”237 Parties that wish 
to emulate the result in the Linex case should strive to convince courts to 
do likewise: to exercise their discretion by presenting them with 
common sense arguments and evaluating the entire spectrum of facts in 
the case. 
Hopefully, these examples have illustrated that the most effective 
method for successfully seeking attorney fees under § 285 is to focus on 
the plain language of the statute, draw analogies to other areas of law, 
and, ultimately, appeal to a judge’s common sense. For almost a decade, 
awards of attorney fees in patent suits were constrained by the “rigid and 
mechanical formulation”238 of the Brooks Furniture framework. Under 
that “exacting standard,”239 parties seeking fees in patent suits could 
only win if they were able to prove—by clear and convincing 
evidence—that the opposing party had engaged in material litigation 
misconduct, or else only when the case was brought in subjective bad 
faith and the claims are objectively baseless.240 That is no longer the 
232. Scott Graham, Apple, HP May Get “Half a Loaf” in Patent Fees, THE RECORDER, July 31, 
2014 (quoting oral argument of defense counsel, Bill Lee, partner at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 
& Dorr). 
233. Id. (quoting plaintiff counsel’s statements at oral argument for attorney fees). 
234. Linex, 2014 WL 4616847, at *5. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at *3 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 
1749, 1756 (2014)). 
238. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754. 
239. iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
240. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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case. After Octane, the analysis of § 285 “begins and ends with the text 
of § 285.”241 Parties should seize this expanded opportunity, and seek to 
persuade district courts to exercise their broad discretion to award fees. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years it was difficult for parties—especially defendants—in 
patent litigation successfully to recover fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. The 
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Octane and Highmark have 
the potential dramatically to change that paradigm. In Octane, the Court 
held that district courts have broad discretion to award attorney fees, and 
that “there is no precise rule or formula for making [such] 
determinations.”242 Instead, the fee shifting statute “imposes one and 
only one constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees 
in patent litigation: The power is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.”243 In 
Highmark, the Court held that, under § 285—due to the highly fact-
dependent nature of the exceptionality determination—district court 
awards of attorney fees are reviewed for abuse of discretion.244 
This Note reviewed the legal landscape under § 285 before Octane 
and Highmark and then evaluated the law that has arisen in the months 
since those decisions reinterpreted the fee-shifting statute. In light of 
these developments, it is reasonable for parties in patent litigation—
especially defendants—to feel empowered more aggressively to seek 
attorney fees under § 285. 
In the new, post-Octane landscape, prevailing parties can recover 
attorney fees if their opponents’ cases are either substantively weak—
based on either the law or the facts of the individual cases—or if the 
cases were litigated in an unreasonable manner.245 To recover fees, this 
Note suggest that litigants should also strive to inform district courts that 
the decision whether or not to award fees lies within their broad 
discretion and that they need not fear easy reversal on this issue. When 
arguing for attorney fees, litigants should follow the Supreme Court’s 
example and focus on the plain meaning of § 285 using common sense 
and expertise gleaned from normal standards of civil litigation 
generally—not just the specialized field of patent litigation. 
 
241. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
242. Id. at 1756. 
243. Id. at 1755–56. 
244. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
245. Id. 
 
                                                     
